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DA PAMPHLET 27-50-32 . HEADQUARTERS,

DEPART~ENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGT6N; D.C.

· Doing Away With the Exclusionary Rule
r.Jy: Major Francis A. Gilligan .and . Captain Frederic 1. Lederer, Criminal Law Di1.1ision,

.TJAGSA .
"The . _criminal is .to go free because the constable has blundered." 1 This had been the rule
in mili ~ary courts-martial in~olving ~llegal
searches and seizures since 1922. Isn't it now
time to ~evise a better rule-one that both protects th,e rights of the citizen ~nd yet also protects th~ innocent or negligent miliiary policeman or :commander? It is our opinion that an
alternative to the exclusionary rule does exist
in the ·Ihilitary.
· ·
·
·
:!

The fourth amendment does not expressly or
implicitly provide a remedy for its violation.
The .re~edy the .courts have fashioned when
there {s ari illegal search or seizure is the
exclusi~nary rule or suppression doctrine. The
exclusipnary rule was first applied to the federal courts in Weeks v. United States; 2 when
the Supre~e . Court held that evidence obtained
in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be
admitted in .evidence at a criminal trial of the
person· whose rights were violated. In Weeks,
the Court stated that without such a rule, the
amendment would be of "no value" to those accused bf crime ,and "might as well be stric)ten
from the Constitution."~ The exclusionary rule
was nqt held applicable to the states until M app
v, Ohio 4 was decided_jn 1961. The military,
·howe\lier, adopted the exclusionary rule much
earlier with the Navy adopting it in 19223 and
the Army in 1924. 8

a

in

The exclusionary rule was . set . forth
the
1951 Manual for Courts-MartiaP and was carried over into the current J969 Revised Manual. a !The first' paragraph of paragraph 162 of
the present Manual ·provides that - evidence
that js "unlawfully" obtained is'inadmissible in
evidence if the . defense has standing to raise
the i~sue. The Manual also indicates that the
exclu,sionary rule applies to derivative as well

as primary evidence. The Analysis of Contents
ofthe 1969 Manu,al indicates that paragraph
152 1: was intended to follow the exclusionary
rul~ as : announced by the Supreme Court. 9
Similarly the Court of Military Appeals has indicated .that it follows the fourth a'mendment
standards announced by the Supreme Court. 10
Thus it can be assumed that the military law of
the fourth amendment is primarily a reflection
of the applicable federal civilian law:
The intent of this article is to focus on the
necessity for future u~e of.the exclusionary rule
within the military. The rule itself has been
also literally enshrined; despite widespread
protest, in the civilian law . 11 Yet it is a rule
that seemingly allows both the criminal and the
erring policeman to go .unpunished :while society suffers the consequences. The justifications
behind the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule 12 are two: judicial integrity 'and deterrence of improper police conduct.
Rationale for Exclusionary Rule.
Courts have often stated that judicial integrequires the .exclusion of illegally obtained
ev~dence. Arg'l:ling f()r the exClusion of evidence
seized through illegal wiretapping in Olmstead
v. · United States, 13 , Justices Brandeis and
Holmes asserted in their dissenting opinions
that the issue of judiCial integrity is a moral or
ethical question not susceptible of easy solution. In Olmstead, Justice Holmes stated that
it was not enough for the Court to disapprove
of the way the e~idence was obtained. Rather,
he thought it better for some criminal to go free ·
rather than the government "play an ignoble
part" in admitting the evidence at trial. 14 Justice Brandeis · said that illegally obtained evidence must be excluded to "preserve the judiri~y
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•. cial process from .contamination/' ~<If the Gov-:ernment be.comes a law breaker," he stated in
an oft-quoted passage, ~<it breeds contempt for
law; ... it invites anarchy." 15 In 1968,. the
Court in Terry v. Ohio 16 reemphasized the
question of judicial integrity:
Courts which ·sit under our ·Constitution
cannot and will not be made a part to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasion.11
While lawyers and judges alike should be
deeply concerned about the integrity of the judicial process, English courts have admitted
such evidence for years is without noticeably
losing their integrity. )ndeed what integrity
exists in letting the guilty and potentially
dangerous escape j1J.stice?
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The second and, we believe, the principal
justification for the exclusionary rule 19 is the
deterrence of illegal police .conduct. As stated
by the Supreme Court:
The purpose of. the exclusionary rule "is to
deter-to compel respect for the Constitutional guarantee in the only effectively
available way-by removing the incentive
to disregard it. " 20
There is little doubt that the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule owes its existence to the perception that it offered the only chance of deterring improper police conduct. h The courts have
indulged in two basic presumptions: that the
rule does in fact deter improper conduct and
that no reasonable alternatives to the rule
exist. Both presumptions are open to serious
question. At present it seems safe to say that
most commentators and many of the judiciary
have concluded that there is no evidence that
'the exclusionary· rule does deter police misconduct.22 That leaves the second prong of the
exclusionary rule's support-the absence of alternative remedies.
Alternatives to Exclusionary Rule.

Historically in the United States .~he type of
remedy available in England to,victirris ofpolice
misconduct-civil law suit against the
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police 23-has been notoriously unsuccessful.
Other remedies have been slow to take root and
it is fair to say that at the time of theMapp decision, let alone Weeks, no viable alternative to
the exclusionary rule may have e~isted. This,
however, is no lol}ger the case, whether in the
civilian world or the military community, A serviceman or woman who believes that a fourth
amendment violation has occurred JllilY take any
or all of the following steps: request relief under
Article 138, UCMJ; 24 institute a law suit under
state substantive law; 25 institute suit under section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971;26 institute
a federal law suit pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics; 27 submit a claim under the Federal
Tort Claims Act; 28 or prefer criminal charges
under Articles 98, 133 or 134 of the UCMJ. 29
The availability of these varied remedies is crucial for if the exclusionary rule is not the sole
legitimate remedy for a foUrth amendment violation, it may well be that the exclusionary rule
could be dispensed with. Chief Justice Burger
stated in Bevins v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 30 that:
The [exclusionary] rule .has rested on a
theory that suppression of evidence in these
circumstances was imperative to deter law
enforcement authorities . . . . If an effective alternative remedy is available, concern for official observance of the law does
not require adherence to the exclusionary
rule.
It is our thesis that viable alternatives to the
exclusionary rule do exist within the military,
and that consideration should be given to creation of a system of remedies that will allow illegal seized evidence to be admissible at trial
while correcting the mistakes that led to the il,.
legal· seizure. After all, unlike the fifth amendment (and Article 31) exclusionary rule and the
exclusion of evidence at trial for irrelevancy, all
of which is partially based on an assumption of
unreliable evidence, evidence seized illegally
under the fourth amendment is perfectly relevant and probative-only public policy prevents
its admission. It is not within the scope of this
article to create a complete system of alternative remedies-that must await an expanded

version to be printed at a later time~ However,
we believe that when combined with the other
remedies that already exist, creation of one new
military institution-a military fourth amendment review board to be created at the installation or division level-would allow departure
from the exclusionary rule.
The Review Board.
lt_is our assumption that military police and
commanders alike would approve of a local review board that would implement the fourth
amendment so long as:
1. There was a clear set of guidelines for

military police and commanders to follow; and
2. Military police and commanders were
represented on the review board.
The review board would review alleged violations of a set of model rules designed to render
the fourth amendment comprehensible and to
supply implementing authorities with clear
guidelines as to their legal authority in various
situations. The rules would he similar in scope to
the Model Rules for Law Enforcement: Warrantless Searches of Persons and Places written
by the Project on Law Enforcement located at
Arizona State University. 31 The review board
would not have disciplinary authority per se. If
it found that an individual had committed an intentional or flagrant abuse it would have the
power to recommend disciplinary action to the
appropriate commander. On the other hand, ifit
were to find that a violation of the fourth
amendment had taken place through negligence
or ignorance it could recommend that no action
be taken, that the individual be counseled by an
attorney in the office of the staff judge advocate
as to the nature of the mistake, or where it was
clear from past actions of the individual that he
was unable, despite good intent, to apply the
rules to real life situations, that appropriate
administrative action be taken. Particularly important would be the board's ability to recommend changes in the local rules to ensure that
they were as workable as possible in view of th~ _
constitutional restraints. The reader may"'' ·
suggest that such a board would be of little use
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in protecting the important constitutional rights
involved. However, this is to ignore two important points. Firstly, if the board establishes a
history of failing to take appropriate action, the
local trial judge will have no option but to bring
back the exclusionary rule. Secondly, to allow
intentional or flagrant violation of promulgated
rules is no less a violation of military discipline
than any other disobedience of orders or military procedure, and certainly our brethen of the
line would not tolerate such behavior once the
rules were sufficiently clear to be understood
and enforced.
Composition of the Review Board.
The effectiveness of a review board would depend to a great extent on its membership. The
board could be composed entirely of commanders or officers. However, a better and more effective board would probably contain a mixture
of commanders, military police, and at least one
JAGC officer. Thus the board could take advantage of the expertise of its members when
weighing the actions of a commander or military
policeman (to include the CID) or when considering changes within the model rules. Since the
board would be composed of military personnel
intimately familiar with the realities of law enforcement it would tend to be less tolerant of unjustified error and equally less prone to recommend severe corrective actions solely because of
an academic mistake. Similarly its decisions
should be subject to great deference within the
military law enforcement community. Since the
police would be policing themselves, our law enforcement personnel could take pride in the
board rather than resenting its actions.
Procedure.
' The board's procedure can only be suggested
in the most general terms. Experience at the
local level will be essential for proper functioning. However, some elements can be suggested.
A complaint may be brought before the board by
any member of the armed services in the jurisdiction served by the board who claims to have
been the victim of a fourth amendment violation, by any board member or by the defense
counsel or commander of an individual so ag-

grieved. While an anonymous complaint rnight
prove desirable we think that it could too easily
be made a vehicle for harassment and believe
that an individual making a complaint must be
prepared for his identity to be made known to
the board. In terms of general procedure it is
suggested that the board act pursuant to Army
Regulation 15-6 and thus comply with all reg~
ulatory requirements.
Promulgati()n of Model Rules ..
The model rules for search and seizure should
not hinder the functions of the commander,
military police, or criminal investigators. The
rules would be promulgated at the local level by
the local board after appropriate consultation
with the staff judge advocate, and they could be
updated as experience requires. Lest there be
fear that the rules might fail to comply with constitutional requirements, the reader should
keep in mind that failure to conform to constitutional minimums would invalidate the board and
reintroduce the exclusionary rule. Additionally,
the existence of the board should have no effect
on the various fiscal remedies that would exist
concurrently. The model rules would be explicit
guidelines that could be followed by laymen
rather than vague principles of academia.
Benefit of a Set of Model Rules.
A set of specific guidelines for personnel with
law enforcement responsibilities would increase
their efficiency by providing the military
policeman or commander with as many specific
answers as can be foreseen. The rights of the
individual soldier should receive increased protection since the guidelines would be specific
enough to prevent predictable fourth amendment mistakesm Placing the rule-making authority in the hands of the experts involved,
bearing in mind as always that the board rnnst
comply with fourth amendment standards,
would ensure realistic and comprehensible rules
giving ample consideration to local problems and
interests. Centralized decision making by the
board when promulgating or updating the rules
would allow the commander, military policeman, or criminal investigator to function according to the rules and with less fear of the con-
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sequences of making a fourth amendment decision.
The use of a review board at post level when
coupled with a set of model rules would provide
a reasonable alternative to the exclusionary
rule. The "police officer's" blunder would no
longer require that the evidence be suppressed.
Rather the evidence• would be admissible (except perhaps in the most egregious intentional
violation) and the "policeman" could be subject
to the type of administrative correction any impartial professional law enforcement agent
would accept. For good faith mistake remedial
education or simply afull explanation of the
error might be appropriate. For repeated good
faith error, possible MOS reclassification .or
other remedy could be appropriate. And for
gross negligence or intentional violation, the entire variety of administrative and criminal
penalties would be available. Thus society and
the "police" would be protected. Only the criminal would lose.
A Possible Scenario.
While the courts may well accept substitutes
for the exclusionary rule, they are likely to be
most hesitant in doing so. It is highly unlikely
that the military trial bench or our appellate
courts would allow use of illegally seized evidence simply because a post has promulgated
model rules and set up a review board. We think
that for maximum likelihood of success, a command would have to set up its system and operate it for a reasonable time period-six months
or longer-before the government could attempt to persuade the local trial judge that a viable alternative to the exclusionary rule existed
in the jurisdiction. At that test case, the prosecution would have to prove that the board had
been effective. Proof would require adequate
evidence of attempts to publicize the board's
existence, the number and nature of complaints
brought before it, and the board's action in each
case. Follow-up actions or lack thereof would
also have to be demonstrated . . Would the prosecution succeed? That would obviously depend
on the trial judge. For a test case to survive for
consideration of the appellate courts, the military judge would ·have to rule that a search or

s~iz~re was illegal but that the exclusionary rule
dtdn t apply. Further, to do so the judge would
have to depart from the seemingly clear language of the Manual for Courts-Martial. This,
however, should not be as difficult at it might
seem. As iJlustrated herein, the military has
applied civilian fourth amendments standards
and paragraph 152 of the Manual can easily be
interpreted as applying only federal fourth
amendment law including the rationales for the
exclusionary rule already discussed. Precedent
for this conclusion and approach can be found in
the decision by the Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Clark. 32 In that case the court
nullified the plain meaning of paragraph 140a(2)
of the Manual which requires offer of counsel
during any interrogation of a military suspect or
accused, holding that the intent behind that
paragraph had only been to adopt Miranda.

Creation of a legitimate alternative to the
fourth amendment exclusionary rule will not be
easy. At a minimum it will take a great deal of
effort and time. It could well prove fruitless at
any specific installation or command. However
at the very least creation of the rules and board
should improve ·search and seizure practices.
The effort to arrive at a replacement for the
exclusionary rule will not be simple, but haven't
too many .criminals gone free already?
.
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